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Abstract 
 
Since 1999, ICSID tribunals have almost systematically held that they have the power not only 
to recommend but also to order provisional measures under Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention and Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules. This article argues that the legal arguments 
offered by these tribunals are often not fully elaborated and in any case not entirely 
convincing. It then provides an alternative reading of the decisions relating to the mandatory 
character of provisional measures, in the sense that they imply a signifi- cant departure from the 
meaning the contracting parties recorded in the treaty. Yet, as the majority of ICSID members 
have endorsed, accepted or at least acquiesced in such departure, it appears that Article 47 of the 
ICSID Convention has been informally modi- fied through subsequent practice. 
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I Introduction 
In a long stream of substantially identical decisions starting with Maffezini v. 
Spain,1 ICSID tribunals have upheld their power to order provisional measures under 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. Since Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention expressly authorizes ICSID tribunals only to recommend such 
measures, it is worth examining the significance and implications of these de- 
cisions from the standpoint of the law of treaties. 
The article first offers a concise discussion of the nature and role of provi- sional 
measures in the settlement of international disputes, before reviewing the leading 
cases of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other inter- national tribunals 
(sections II to IV). It then briefly describes the emergence of what appears to be a 
jurisprudence constante in ICSID investment arbitra- tion (section V) and 
examines the persuasiveness of the underlying legal rea- soning (section VI). Section 
VII is dedicated to the attitudes of ICSID members with regard to these decisions. 
The final objective of the article is to appraise the impact of the concordant body of 
decisions in combination with the (lack of) reaction of Member States to the ICSID 
Convention from the standpoint of the interpretation and possibly the informal 
modification of Article 47. 
The discussion is limited to the alleged competence of ICSID tribunals to order 
provisional measures. It does not deal with the relationship between provisional 
measures and jurisdiction nor the conditions under which provi- sional measures 
can be granted. 
 
II Provisional Measures in the Settlement of International Disputes 
When a case is filed before an international tribunal, the object of the whole 
procedure is to settle the dispute and to grant effective remedies to the parties to the 
extent the claims, and possibly the counterclaims, brought forward are considered 
to have merit. The dispute concerns a network of material or im- material goods as 
well as subjective legal situations (rights and obligations). In the nature of things, the 
procedure takes some time and tribunals may grant interim protection or 
provisional measures, the purpose of which is “to pre- serve the respective rights of 
the Parties, pending a decision of the Court, and 
 
 
 
1 See infra note 33. 
  
 
presupposes that irreparable prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the 
subject of dispute in judicial proceedings”.2 
Provisional measures normally set up duties of abstention rather than call- ing 
upon the parties to perform possibly onerous actions. They are not made the object 
of a judgment. The latter is a jurisdictional act covered by the force of res judicata 
and flows from a contentious procedure during which the com- peting arguments of 
the parties are heard and the court decides on the claim. Provisional measures are 
rather pronounced through an order (ordonnance). This entails that in cases of 
urgency there is no need to go through the parties’ arguments as ordinarily set out in 
written pleadings and presented at hearings. This course of procedure gives the matter 
the necessary flexibility: provisional measures can be altered during the proceedings 
and new ones can be granted. There is no res judicata attached to such measures,3 
with the possible excep- tion that an arbitral tribunal would violate procedural 
public policy if it de- parted from opinions expressed in a preliminary award 
rendered in the same case.4 When the tribunal declines to exercise its jurisdiction 
or delivers the final judgment, the provisional measures automatically lose their 
function and expire. The “interim” protection thus gives way to the substantive 
“final” pro- tection of the rights and obligations at stake. 
Although provisional measures are normally requested by the parties,5 the issue 
of interim protection may also be raised in the interest of the tribunal in the proper 
administration of justice and effectiveness of the proceedings of which it is seized. 
If the final judgment’s impact can be impaired by actions of the parties while the 
dispute is pending, the prestige of the tribunal and the effectiveness of its 
adjudication process could be heavily jeopardized. That is 
 
2 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 
15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 13, para. 35. 
3 See C. Schreuer with L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention. A 
Commentary (2nd ed., 2009), 774–775. In Pey Casado v. Chile, infra note 33, para. 14, the tri- 
bunal held that “[i]l y a lieu d’ajouter que les mesures conservatoires, qui sont du reste pro- visoires 
par nature et par définition (comme l’observe avec raison la Partie défenderesse), peuvent être 
modifiées ou annulées en tout temps par le Tribunal, ne jouissent pas de la force de res judicata […]”. 
4 Swiss Supreme Court, Decision 4A_606/2013, 2 September 2014, as reported by P. Bärtsch, A. 
Truttmann, Swiss Supreme Court Clarifies Res Judicata Effect of Preliminary Award Rendered 
by same Arbitrators in same Proceedings, at http://www.swlegal.ch/getdoc/9923adda-688b 
-4e6e-8c4f-d4331ee7e48b/2014_Philippe-Baertsch_Aileen-Truttmann_Swiss-Supr.aspx. 
5 Such a demand can be presented at any time during the proceedings. For the ICJ, see Article 73 (1), 
Rules of Court (1978). 
  
 
the reason why provisional measures can also be taken by tribunals on their own 
authority (proprio motu).6 
With regard to the binding effect of provisional measures, there are two 
schools of thought.7 On one hand, it has been argued, with regard to the pro- visional 
measures indicated by the ICJ, that their binding character is func- tionally 
indispensable as otherwise the very object of the entire proceedings, namely the 
protection of the parties’ rights, would be frustrated. The argument is further 
buttressed by the principle of good faith in the sense that, once the parties have 
accepted the tribunal’s jurisdiction, they also assume certain accessory 
obligations which are necessary to enable the tribunal to fully dis- charge its 
mission.8 The binding nature of provisional measures has also been considered as 
inherent to the tribunal’s function or dictated by logic.9 
On the other hand, some authors have maintained that there is no neces- sary 
symmetry between the final judgment and provisional measures. Inspired by the 
principle that the sovereignty of States should not be limited without a clear legal 
entitlement to do so, and fearing that a bold course on provisional measures could 
discourage States to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, they have argued that these 
measures ought to be considered non-binding unless 
 
 
 
6 For the ICJ, see Article 75 (1), Rules of Court (1978). 
7 For a full discussion, see R. Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public (2000), 608 ff., or 
The International Court of Justice (2013), esp. 641–645. 
8 See, in particular, L. Daniele, Le misure cautelari nel processo dinanzi alla Corte 
Internazionale di Giustizia (1993), esp. 150. In Quiborax v. Bolivia, infra note 33, para. 592, the 
tribunal held that “The principle of good faith involves the duty not to perform any act that 
would defeat the object and purpose of the obligation that has been undertaken by the parties, 
even if the act itself is not expressly prohibited by the provisions of the treaty” (footnote 
omitted). 
9 According to G.G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice, 1951–1954”, 34 British Yearbook of International Law (1958), 1, 122, “the whole logic of 
the jurisdiction to indicate interim measures entails that, when indicated, they are binding – 
for this jurisdiction is based on the absolute necessity, when the circumstances call for it, of 
being able to preserve, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of any par- ties, as determined 
by the final judgment of the Court”. See also L. Collins, “Provisional and Protective Measures 
in International Litigation”, 234 Recueil des Cours (1992-III), 9; L. Gross, “Some 
Observations on Provisional Measures”, in Y. Dinstein et al. (eds.), International Law at a 
Time of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of S. Rosenne (1989), 307; 
K. Oellers-Frahm, “Article 41”, in A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat, K. Oellers-Frahm, 
C.J. Tams (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice, A Commentary (2nd ed., 
2012), 1038. 
  
 
the court or tribunal has been conferred the power to attach to them a binding 
character.10 
 
III Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
According to Article 41 (1) of its Statute, the ICJ “shall have the power to indi- cate, 
if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought 
to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party”.11 Prior to 2001, there 
was a “profound divergence in the views of authoritative commentators” as to 
whether provisional measures are binding.12 The wording of the Statute is all but clear. 
The question of the binding nature of provisional measures was deliberately left 
open at the drafting stage of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in 1920. The word “indicate” rather than “order” or “decide” may 
suggest non-mandatory measures; but, in reality, the word is compatible with 
either interpretation, since it is neutral. The words “ought to be taken” rather than 
“shall be taken” may also suggest some non-binding feature; but the corresponding 
French wording, predomi- nant in 1920, reads “doivent être prises”, which conveys 
the idea of a binding character. 
The practice of the Court was not conclusive for many years. Since no State 
requested a sanction for non-observance of provisional measures, the Court took 
only an oblique position on the question.13 In addition, the practice of States was 
inconclusive: some provisional injunctions were heeded by the 
 
 
 
10 See, in particular, J. Sztucki, Interim Measures in The Hague Court (1983); H. Thirlway, “The 
Indication of Provisional Measures by the ICJ”, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Provisional Measures 
Indicated by International Courts (1994), 1. 
11 The other authentic text reads “La Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si elle estime que les 
circonstances l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être prises à 
titre provisoire”. In doctrine, see, in particular, S. Rosenne, Provisional Measures in 
International Law: The International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (2005); K. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 9, 1062–1069; J.J. Quintana, Litigation at 
the International Court of Justice (2015), Chapter 11. 
12 R. Kolb, International Court of Justice, supra note 7, 644. See also L. Collins, supra note 9, esp. 
216 ff.; S. Rosenne, supra note 11, esp. 34 ff. 
13 In Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 248, para. 41, the Court 
held that the “United States should take all measures”. The French text more clearly reads: “Les 
Etats-Unis doivent prendre toutes les mesures”. 
  
 
concerned party, while many other injunctions were finally not carried out.14 
There was thus no clear opinio juris on the matter. 
The situation changed in 2001 when the ICJ found that 
 
[i]t follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from the 
terms of Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to indi- cate 
provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as 
the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call 
for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as 
determined by the final judgment of the Court.15 
The main point, according to the Court, is to preserve to the full extent its own ability 
to properly fulfil its judicial function. The finding was consistently reit- erated in 
subsequent decisions. 
In 2007, the ICJ further held that the finding in the LaGrand decision on the 
mandatory character of provisional measures merely clarified (rather than 
developed) the meaning that Article 41 of the Statute had always had, with the 
consequence that it was applicable to measures adopted before 2001. It observed 
that 
its ‘orders on provisional measures under Article 41 [of the Statute] have 
binding effect’ (LaGrand […]). Although the Court only had occasion to 
make such a finding in a judgment subsequent to the Orders that it made in the 
present dispute, this does not affect the binding nature of those Orders, since 
in the Judgment referred to the Court did no more than give the provisions of the 
Statute the meaning and scope that they had pos- sessed from the outset. It 
notes that provisional measures are aimed at preserving the rights of each of 
the parties pending the final decision of the Court. The Court’s Orders of 8 April 
and 13 September 1993 indicating 
 
 
 
14 K. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 9, 1065–1066. 
15 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 466, para. 
102. In the literature, see, in particular, R.Y. Jennings, “The LaGrand Case”, 1 The Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2002), 50; C. Tams, M. Memmecke, “The 
LaGrand Case”, 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002), 449; R. Sloane, 
“Measures Necessary to Ensure: The ICJ’s Provisional Measures Order in Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals”, 17 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004), 673; R. Kolb, “Note 
on the New International Case-Law Concerning the Binding Character of Provisional 
Measures”, 74 Nordic Journal of International Law (2005), 117. 
  
 
provisional measures created legal obligations which both Parties were 
required to satisfy.16 
This statement might obscure rather than clarify the role of the Court. Article 41 of 
the Statute as it originally stood left the question of the binding nature of such 
measures entirely open. The drafting history, the text or the practice of the Court in its 
formative years do not yield any clear answers to the question. Thus, the 2001 
decision is in reality a piece of legal craftsmanship based on te- leological and 
effectiveness considerations, with the aim of strengthening the judicial process at the 
ICJ and not losing ground with respect to tribunals, such as the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which possess the power to indicate binding 
provisional measures. 
The Court modestly veiled this part of judicial creativity by hiding 
behind the classic positivistic canon whereby the decision taken flows from the 
applicable norm in its original complexion. Lex semper loquitur. This fic- tion 
has perhaps a certain importance in international law where sovereign States are 
particularly sensitive to inroads into their sovereignty. Its function is to reassure 
States about the “proper behaviour” of the ICJ, which purportedly does not seek to 
carve out from the Statute more powers than States (origi- nally) granted to it. But 
it stands to reason that institutional texts, as much as others, must not be interpreted 
only in the light of their historical sense. The interpreter can take into account later 
developments and engage in objective or dynamic interpretation of the meaning a 
provision should have today. This the Court did; and on that account it cannot be 
blamed. 
Another aspect of the matter needs to be noted. Often, the analysis stops with the 
finding that provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute have legally 
binding character. Apart from the fact that the ICJ could also issue non-binding 
measures if it found that through an appropriate course (who can do more can do 
less), little room is devoted to the exact consequences of that finding. It has been 
argued that the statement of the Court in LaGrand is disas- trous since it might affect 
the readiness of States to submit their disputes to the Court.17 This classic argument, 
used every time the Court has not deferred to the whims and wishes of a State, has no 
great weight: since 2001, there has been no significant change in the submission of 
cases to the Court. 
 
16 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, 
para. 452. 
17 See H. Thirlway, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–1989 (Part 
Twelve)”, 72 British Yearbook of International Law (2001), 37, at 126. 
  
 
But taking now a look from another perspective, the question remains as to what 
consequences the breach of the provisional injunction entails. As with any breach 
of international obligations, non-compliance with binding pro- visional 
measures engages international responsibility and triggers the duty to make 
reparation.18 With regard to the form of reparation, in particular, a perusal of the 
recent practice shows that the Court limits itself to granting satisfaction for the 
breach of such measures through a finding in its reasoning and one operative 
paragraph. In other words, the Court states in its judgment on the merits that the 
concerned State has breached the obligation to execute the provisional measures. The 
Court even refused to burden the wrongfully be- having State with procedural costs 
under Article 64 of the Statute, with regard to additional costs provoked by the 
breach of these measures (e.g. additional pleadings for other provisional 
measures).19 This is hardly an incentive to hon- our such measures. 
The Court should endeavour to give more teeth to its binding measures under 
Article 41 of the Statute. One option would be to place procedural costs on the party 
at fault under a new interpretation of Article 64 of the Statute. Another option 
would be to impose specific duties of restitution or of compen- sation for all the 
proximate (as opposed to incidental or remote) consequences of the unlawful act. 
Still another option would be to elaborate a specific set of consequences for that type 
of unlawful act, e.g. certain procedural disadvan- tages for the State at fault, thus, 
that State would not receive certain benefits as long as it had not executed the 
measures. It also stands to reason that these approaches could be combined. For the 
time being, the Court seems to be re- maining extremely cautious in this regard. It 
seems to have been impressed about the leap it dared to take in 2001 and therefore 
desirous of waiting for some time to pass before carrying further ahead on this 
subject matter. 
 
IV Other International Tribunals 
Although a review of the law and practice of international tribunals with re- gard 
to provisional measures is clearly beyond the scope of this article, it is 
 
18 See Articles 28 ff. of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001. 
19 See, in particular, Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica 
v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 15 December 2015, para. 127, and, as to procedural costs, para. 144. The 
decision has been rightly criticized by Judges Tomka, Greenwood, Sebutinde and Judge ad 
hoc Dugard. 
  
 
worth briefly discussing the provisions contained in some international legal 
instruments related to the settlement of international disputes. In some of them, 
the binding nature of these measures is uncontroversial. This is the case, in particular, 
of Article 290 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, which provides that “the 
court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers 
appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the re- spective rights of the 
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, 
pending the final decision”.20 
In the same vein, Article 33 (1) of the Revised General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes reads “the International Court of Justice, acting 
in accordance with Article 41 of its Statute, or the Arbitral Tribunal, shall lay down 
within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be ad- opted. The 
parties to the dispute shall be bound to accept such measures”.21 
Similarly, Article 63 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Rule 
25 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights leave no 
doubt about the binding nature of provisional measures. Article 63 (2) provides that 
“in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable 
damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems 
pertinent in matters it has under consideration”, whereas under Rule 25 the Court 
“may, at the request of a party or on its own motion, order such provisional 
measures as it deems pertinent”. The Inter-American Court has consistently 
indicated that compliance with provisional measures is necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of its decisions on the merits and has not hesitated to order the 
concerned State to adopt provisional measures.22 
The binding nature of provisional measures under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, on the contrary, has been controversial for several years. 
 
20 P. Tomka, G.I. Hernández, “Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea”, in H.P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity. Liber 
Amicorum R. Wolfrum (2012), Vol. II, 1763. See PCA Case No. 2015–28, The “Erica Lexie” 
Incident (Italy v. India), Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, 29 April 2016, 
esp. paras. 72, 120 and 132, at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1707. An identi- cal provision 
can be found in Article 31.1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes. 
21 The authentic French text reads: “la Cour International de Justice, statuant conformé- ment à 
l’Article 41 de son Statut, ou le Tribunal arbitral, indiquera, dans le plus bref délai possible, 
quelles mesures provisoires doivent être prises. Les parties en litige seront tenues de s’y 
conformer”. 
22 For a recent example, see Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of May 29, 2013. 
Provisional Measures with regard to El Salvador Matter of B, available at http://www 
.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/B_se_01_ing.pdf. 
  
 
Neither the Convention nor its Protocols expressly refer to provisional mea- sures. 
In 1991, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held by a ten to nine majority 
that the (then) European Commission of Human Rights had not been bestowed by 
the Convention with the power to adopt mandatory provi- sional measures.23 
On 17 June and 8 July 2002, the European Court of Human Rights inserted Rule 
39 according to which the Court may, at the request of a party or of any other person 
concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any inter- im measure which it 
considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of 
the proceedings. Although Rule 39 is not drafted in clear, mandatory terms, in 2003, 
the European Court of Human Rights followed without hesitation the ICJ decision 
in LaGrand and held that: 
[interim measures] enable the State concerned to discharge its obliga- tion to 
comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by 
virtue of Article 46 of the Convention. […] any State Party to the 
Convention to which interim measures have been indicated in order to 
avoid irreparable harm being caused to the victim of an alleged violation must 
comply with those measures and refrain from any act or omission that will 
undermine the authority and effectiveness of the final judgment.24 
Two years later, the Grand Chamber upheld the finding and definitively settled the 
question.25 It must nonetheless be noted that three judges dissented and argued that 
 
23 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, No. 15576/89, Judgment, 20 March 1991, paras. 102– 
103. Rule 36 of the Rules of the European Commission on Human Rights reads: “The 
Commission, or when it is not in session, the President may indicate to the parties any interim 
measure the adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or the proper 
conduct of the proceedings before it”. 
24 Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, No. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Judgment, 6 
February 2003, paras. 104–110. 
25 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, No. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Grand Chamber, 4 
February 2005. The Court concluded that “[a] failure by a Contracting State to comply with 
interim measures is to be regarded as preventing the Court from effectively examin- ing the 
applicant’s complaint and as hindering the effective exercise of his or her right and, 
accordingly, as a violation of Article 34” (para. 128). On these decisions, see C.J. Tams, “Interim 
Orders by the ECTHR – Comments on Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey”, 63 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2003), 681; K. Oellers- 
Frahm, “Verbindlichkeit einstweiliger Massnahmen: Der EMGR vollzieht – endlich – die 
  
 
neither Article 26 (d) of that Convention, empowering the Court to enact Rules 
of Procedure, nor Article 34, instituting the right of individual appli- cation, is 
sufficiently connected to the issue under consideration to fill a ‘gap’ in the 
Convention by instituting binding interim measures ex nihilo, thereby 
imposing on the States Parties to the Convention an obligation without their 
consent. In other words, there is a big difference between a simple 
interpretation of a treaty and its amendment, or between the exercise of the 
judicial role and international legislation.26 
Since then, the ECtHR has systematically reiterated its position on the binding nature 
of provisional measures. In a recent case, for instance, it stressed 
the special importance attached to interim measures in the Convention 
system. Their purpose is not only to enable an effective examination of the 
application to be carried out but also to ensure that the protection afforded 
to the applicant by the Convention is effective; such measures subsequently 
allow the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execu- tion of the final 
judgment. Interim measures thus enable the State con- cerned to discharge its 
obligation to comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally 
binding by virtue of Article 46 of the Convention.27 
Yet, the binding nature of provisional measures has not gone unchallenged and States 
have occasionally refused to comply with them.28 In Amirov v. Russia, for instance, the 
respondent government challenged the legally binding force of the provisional 
measures and argued that the power to issue such measures cannot be drawn from 
Article 34 of the Convention or from any other source.29 The developments related to 
the European Convention on Human Rights further confirm the tendency to affirm 
the binding character of provisional measures under the different schemes of 
international adjudication that exist. It has been argued that a general principle of 
international law has emerged 
 
erforderliche Wende in seiner Rechtsprechung”, 30 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 
(2003), 689; G. Cohen-Jonathan, “Sur la force obligatoire des mesures provisoires. L’arrêt de la 
Grande Chambre européenne du 4 février 2005”, 109 Revue Générale de Droit 
International Public (2005), 421. 
26 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, supra note 25, Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, para. 11. 
27 Amirov v. Russia, No. 51857/13, Judgment, 27 November 2014, para. 66. 
28 See, in particular, W.A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights (2015), 
750–751. 
29 Amirov v. Russia, supra note 27, para. 62. 
  
 
and that any standing international jurisdiction should be presumed to have the 
power to issue binding provisional measures when they are entitled to “in- dicate”, 
“order”, “prescribe” or “adopt” such measures.30 It is against this back- ground that 
the ICSID jurisprudence has to be appreciated. 
 
V Decisions by ICSID Tribunals 
The adoption of provisional measures by ICSID tribunals is governed by Article 47 of 
the ICSID Convention and further defined in Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules.31 
In accordance with Article 47 of the ICSID Convention, a tribunal “may, if it 
considers the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which 
should be taken to preserve the respective interests of either party” (emphasis added). 
In the other two authentic languages, namely French and Spanish, Article 47 reads 
respectively: “le Tribunal peut, s’il estime que les circonstances l’exigent, 
recommander toutes mesures conservatoires propres à sauvegarder les droits des 
parties” (emphasis added); and “el Tribunal, si con- sidera que las circunstancias así 
lo requieren, podrá recomendar la adopción de aquellas medidas provisionales que 
considere necesarias para salvaguardar los respectivos derechos de las partes”. 
Under Rule 39 of the Arbitral Rules, in turn, 
 
a party may request that provisional measures for the preservation of its 
rights be recommended by the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights 
to be preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested, 
and the circumstances that require such measures (emphasis added). 
 
30 A. Tzanakopoulos, “Provisional Measures Indicated by International Courts: Emergence of a 
General Principle of International Law”, 57 Revue Hellenique de droit international 
(2004), 53. 
31 In the literature, see, in particular, Z. Mavrogordato, G. Sidere, “The Nature and 
Enforceability of ICSID Provisional Measures”, 75 Arbitration (2009), 38; G. Kaufmann- 
Kohler, A. Antonietti, “Interim Relief in International Investment Agreements”, in 
K. Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under International Investment Agreements: An 
Analysis of the Key Procedural, Jurisdictional and Substantive Issues (2010), 530; D. Sarooshi, 
“Provisional Measures and Investment Treaty Arbitration”, 29 Arbitration International 
(2013), 361; S. Luttrell, “ICSID Provisional Measures ‘In the Round’”, 31 Arbitration 
International (2015), 393; B. Stern, “Interim/Provisional Measures, Occidental v. Ecuador, 
ICSID ARB/06/11”, in M. Kinnear et al. (eds.), Building International Investment Law. The 
First 50 Years of ICSID (2016), 627. 
  
 
While the French version perfectly coincides with the English one,32 the 
Spanish version contains a significant difference as it reads 
cualquiera de las partes […] puede solicitar que el Tribunal recomiende la 
adopción de medidas provisionales para la salvaguardia de sus derechos. La 
solicitud deberá especificar los derechos que se salvaguardarán, las medidas 
cuya recomendación se pide, y las circunstancias que hacen necesaria la 
dictación de tales medidas (emphasis added). 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules stand in 
sharp contrast with Article 26 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules under which 
arbitral tribunals may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures. With one 
exception, all tribunals that have dealt with this issue have held that, under Article 
47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules, they have been 
conferred the power not only to recommend but also to bind the parties with regard to 
provisional measures.33 In Maffezini v. Spain, 
 
 
32 The French text reads: “une partie peut […] requérir que des mesures provisoires pour la 
conservation de ses droits soient recommandées par le Tribunal. La requête spécifie les droits 
devant être préservés, les mesures dont la recommandation est sollicitée et les circonstances qui 
rendent ces mesures nécessaires” (emphasis added). 
33 Amongst the many decisions in this sense, see Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Procedural Order No. 2, 28 October 1999, para. 9; Pey Casado and President Allende 
Foundation v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Provisional Measures, 25 September 2001, paras. 
19–20; Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Procedural Order No. 1, 1 July 2003, 
para. 4; Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Provisional Measures, 6 August 2003, 
paras. 30–31; Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Provisional Measures, 17 
August 2007, para. 58; City Oriente Ltd v. Ecuador and Empresa Estatal de Petróleos del 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, Provisional Measures, 19 November 2007, para. 52; 
Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Provisional Measures, 8 May 
2009, para. 43; Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Provisional 
Measures, 29 June 2009, paras. 62 ff.; Quiborax S.A. and Non-Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Bolivia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Provisional Measures, 26 February 2010, para. 108, and Award, 15 
September 2015, paras. 578–579; Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, 
Award, 7 December 2011, paras. 24 and 29 (Decision on provi- sional measures (not public)); 
Tethyan v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1, Provisional Measures, 13 December 2012, para. 
120; RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Request for Security 
for Costs, 13 August 2014, para. 48; PNGSustainable Development Program Ltd. v. Papua New 
Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33, Provisional Measures, 15 January 2015, para. 102; 
Transglobal Green Energy, LLC and Transglobal Green Energy de Panama, S.A. v. Panama, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/28, Provisional Measures, 21 January 2016, para. 25; Valle Verde 
Sociedad Financiera S.L. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
  
 
the tribunal for the first time addressed the question of the hortatory or man- datory 
character of provisional measures. It took into account only the English and Spanish 
versions and focused on Rule 39. It held that 
[w]hile there is a semantic difference between the word ‘recommend’ as used 
in Rule 39 and the word ‘order’ as used elsewhere in the Rules to describe the 
Tribunal’s ability to require a party to take a certain action, the difference is 
more apparent than real. It should be noted that the Spanish text of that Rule 
uses also the word ‘dictación’. The Tribunal does not believe that the parties to 
the Convention meant to create a substan- tial difference in the effect of these 
two words. The Tribunal’s authority to rule on provisional measures is no less 
binding than that of a final award. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Order, 
the Tribunal deems the word ‘recommend’ to be of equivalent value as the 
word ‘order’.34 
After the decision in LaGrand was delivered, several ICSID tribunals shared the 
teleological argument developed by the ICJ with regard to Article 41 of the ICJ 
Statute. In Pey Casado v. Chile, in particular, the tribunal opined that Article 47 of 
the ICSID Convention was modelled (“directement inspiré”) on Article 41 of the ICJ 
Statute.35 It borrowed the teleological argument developed by the ICJ in LaGrand to 
uphold the mandatory character of provisional measures on the need to preserve the 
(possible) execution of the pending decision on the mer- its and to prevent that a 
party’s acts or omissions could undermine the rights of the other party.36 In 
Perenco v. Ecuador, the tribunal also included in the equation the term “request”, 
which appears in ICSID Arbitration Rule 39, and concluded that “[t]he parallels 
between ‘recommend’ in the ICSID Convention 
 
ARB/12/18, Provisional Measures, 25 January 2016, para. 75; United Utilities (Tallinn) B.V. and 
Aktsiaselts Tallinna Vesi v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/24, Provisional Measures, 12 May 
2016, para. 109. 
34 Maffezini v. Spain, supra note 33, para. 9. Other tribunals emphasised the importance of the 
verb ‘dictar’ used in the Spanish text, see, for instance, Transglobal v. Panama, supra note 33, 
para. 25. 
35 Pey Casado v. Chile, supra note 33, para. 2, quoted with approval by other tribunals, i.e. 
CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II Investments B.V. v. Bolivia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/15, Provisional Measures, 10 March 2010, para. 39. In City Oriente Ltd 
v. Ecuador, supra note 33, para. 53, the tribunal held that “[i]n any event, whatever the 
meaning ascribed to such words, a failure to comply with orders given to Respondents by the 
Tribunal in accordance with Article 47 of the Convention will entail a violation of Article 26 
thereof, and engage Respondents’ liability”. 
36 Pey Casado v. Chile, supra note 33, paras. 19–20. 
  
 
and ‘indicate’ in the ICJ Statute are quite clear, suggesting that one cannot rightly 
assume that a ‘request’ is comparatively weaker than a ‘recommenda- tion’, or that 
neither is binding”.37 
The argument was fortified by a reference to the principle that the parties to a 
pending dispute should not take steps that might aggravate it or prejudice the 
execution of the award.38 In Perenco v. Ecuador, the tribunal held that 
[i] rrespective of the precise terminology used, the Tribunal’s efforts to 
effectuate its mandate under a treaty by prevailing on the parties to 
maintain the status quo in the case before it are binding on the par- ties 
pursuant to their obligations under said treaty. […]. In becoming a Party to a 
treaty such as the ICSID Convention […], a State confers upon an arbitral 
tribunal jurisdiction over certain claims and assumes an obli- gation to take 
whatever steps might be necessary to comply with deci- sions rendered by 
the tribunal pursuant to the treaty. So long as and to the extent that the 
arbitration is in progress, both parties are under an international obligation 
to comply with whatever the tribunal issues as provisional measures for the 
purpose of protecting its jurisdiction and its ability, should it so decide, to grant 
the relief requested. State Parties to the ICSID Convention thus inherently are 
under an international obliga- tion to comply with provisional measures issued 
by an ICSID tribunal.39 
A stream of decisions confirming the mandatory character of provisional mea- sures 
has followed this line of reasoning.40 Tribunals refrained from under- 
 
 
37 Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Ecuador, note 33, para. 69 in fine. In the same vein, see also City 
Oriente Limited v. Ecuador, supra note 33, para. 393; Quiborax v. Bolivia, supra note 33, 
Provisional Measures, para. 108. 
38 Para. 24. 
39 Perenco v. Ecuador, supra note 33, paras. 66 and 67. In the same vein, in Burlington v. 
Ecuador, supra note 33, para. 66, the tribunal held that “by ratifying the ICSID Convention, 
Ecuador has accepted that an ICSID tribunal may order measures on a provisional basis, even in a 
situation which may entail some interference with sovereign powers and enforcement 
duties”. 
40 See the decision referred to in note 33. It must nonetheless be noted that some tribunals have 
referred only to their authority to recommend provisional measures under Article 47, ICSID 
Convention; see, for instance, Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Provisional Measures, 6 April 2007, paras. 29–30; Railroad Development Corporation v. 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Provisional Measures, 15 October 2008, para. 31; 
Hydro S.r.l. and others v. Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/28, Provisional Measures, 3 
March 2016, paras. 3.7, 3.12, 3.41 and 5.1. 
  
 
taking any detailed analysis of the relevant provisions and simply conformed 
themselves to what they considered as the consolidated jurisprudence on this point, 
normally accompanied with reference to a couple of prior decisions. 
The following sequence of decisions clearly illustrates how tribunals have built 
up the jurisprudence on this point. In Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, the tribu- nal 
confined itself to point out that “according to a well-established principle laid 
down by the jurisprudence of the ICSID tribunals, provisional measures 
‘recommended’ by an ICSID tribunal are legally compulsory; they are in effect 
‘ordered’ by the tribunal, and the parties are under a legal obligation to comply with 
them”.41 
Four years later, another tribunal held that “although Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention uses the word ‘recommend’, the Tribunal is, in fact, empowered to order 
provisional measures. This has been recognized by numerous interna- tional 
tribunals, among them the ICSID tribunal in the Tokios Tokelés case”.42 Another 
eight years passed and in PNG v. Papua New Guinea the tribunal reiterated the 
power of ICSID tribunals to order – instead of recommend – provisional 
measures.43 It refrained from elaborating any legal argument to support this 
conclusion and laconically relied on a single decision, Occidental 
v. Ecuador, which in turn made a reference to “numerous international tribu- nals”, 
but expressly indicates only the tribunal appointed in Tokios Tokelés v. 
Ukraine.44 
The view that ICSID tribunals may order provisional measures under Article 47 
has found limited opposition. In Caratube v. Kazakhstan, the tribunal held, 
without any explanation, that “according to Rule 39, the Tribunal cannot order, but 
can only recommend provisional measures in ICSID proceedings”.45 In a more 
recent case, a dissenting arbitrator argued that the text of Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention and Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules is unequivocal 
 
41 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, supra note 33, para. 4. 
42 Occidental v. Ecuador, supra note 33, para. 58. 
43 PNG v. Papua New Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33, supra note 33, para. 102. In RSM 
v. Saint Lucia, supra note 33, para. 48, the tribunal held that “[t]here is no question, in 
general, that the Tribunal has the authority to order provisional measures to preserve a 
Party’s right”. Regrettably, it failed to indicate any legal argument – either directly or 
through prior decisions – to support the finding. 
44 Similarly, in United Utilities v. Estonia, supra note 33, para. 109, the tribunal considered that 
“it has the authority to order, not merely to ‘recommend’, provisional measures. This has 
been recognised by many ICSID tribunals, as stated in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine” (emphasis 
added). 
45 Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, 
Provisional Measures, 31 July 2009, para. 67. 
  
 
in providing that an ICSID tribunal may recommend – as opposed to order – 
provisional measures. In his words, “no matter how many times it is repeated, an 
order is not a recommendation. Only in the jurisprudence of an imaginary 
Wonderland would this make sense”.46 He further fortified the literal interpre- tation 
with a double acontrario argument. On the one hand, he argued that had the 
contracting parties to the ICSID Convention intended to confer on ICSID tribunals 
the power to order provisional measures they would have drafted Article 47 
differently and articulated some standards or guidance for grant- ing these 
measures. On the other hand, he emphasised that, unlike Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention, the corresponding article in the Additional Facility Rules – Article 46 – 
contains a reference to the provisional measures “ordered” by the tribunal.47 
Additionally, the legally binding nature of provisional mea- sures has been 
occasionally challenged – without success – by States.48 
Apart from this rather isolated criticism, ICSID tribunals’ decisions on pro- 
visional measures resemble a litany combining, on the one hand, the admis- sion 
that the ordinary meaning, the context and the travaux préparatoires of Article 
47 of the ICSID Convention militate against the power to order such measures, 
and, on the other hand, the decisive findings based on the Spanish text of Rule 39 of 
the Arbitration Rules as well as on the ICJ jurisprudence that provisional measures 
need to be mandatory in order to fulfil their function, namely to preserve 
effectively the rights of the parties. The award in Quiborax 
v. Bolivia, dealing, inter alia, with the order issued by the tribunal to the re- 
spondent to take as a matter of provisional measures all appropriate measures to 
suspend certain criminal proceedings directly related to the arbitration,49 
conveniently states the point. In the tribunal’s words, 
[i]t is true that the ordinary meaning of this provision, especially the 
terms ‘recommend’ and ‘should be taken’ do not convey the notion of a 
binding order. The same can be said for the context; other provisions of the 
ICSID Convention use different language when referring to binding 
 
 
46 E. Nottingham, dissenting opinion in RSM Production v. Saint Lucia, supra note 33, 
para. 16. 
47 Ibid., para. 4. 
48 See, for instance, the position of the respondent in Quiborax v. Bolivia, supra note 33, 
Award, para. 574 (a). 
49 On decisions by investment tribunals related to the continuation of domestic proceed- ings and 
the related level of deference, see D. Kalderimis, “The Authority of Investment Treaty 
Tribunals to Issue Orders Restraining Domestic Court Proceedings”, 31 ICSID Review 
(2016), 549, esp. 562–563. 
  
 
obligations. Similarly, the travaux préparatoires of the ICSID Convention, to 
the extent relevant as supplementary means of interpretation, show that an 
earlier draft using the word ‘prescribe’ was then changed to ‘rec- ommend’. 
Despite this, ICSID tribunals have consistently found that they have the 
power to make binding orders for provisional measures. The rationale is that 
these decisions derive their mandatory force from the function of provisional 
remedies, which is to secure the applicant’s rights while the proceedings are 
pending. To use the words of the ICJ in LaGrand, ‘the power in question is 
based on the necessity, when the cir- cumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to 
avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment 
of the Court’. While the wording and the context of Article 41 of the ICJ 
Statute are not strictly identical to those of the ICSID Convention (‘indicate’ 
instead of ‘recom- mend’), the function of the measures is the same.50 
The tribunal also held that failure to adopt the provisional measures ordered under 
Article 47 amounts to a breach of such provision, but does not neces- sarily entail a 
violation of the duty to arbitrate in good faith.51 It did not attach any specific 
consequences to non-compliance with provisional measures. It is generally 
accepted that ICSID tribunals may take the attitude of the parties regarding 
provisional measures into account when dealing with the merits of the dispute. 
 
VI Analysis of Legal Argument in Favour of the Mandatory Character of 
Provisional Measures according to the Applicable Legal 
Provisions 
It is submitted that the finding that ICSID tribunals have the power not only to 
recommend but also to impose provisional measures is not persuasive as a matter of 
treaty interpretation. In the first place, the focus and insistence 
 
 
50 Quiborax v. Bolivia, supra note 33, Award, paras. 578–579. On preparatory work, see infra 
text note 57. 
51 The tribunal felt the need to clarify in footnote 743 that “provisional measures issued under 
Article 47 are binding per se, a failure to comply with them will automatically entail a breach of 
Article 47. This does not necessarily give rise to a breach of the underlying right that the 
measures seek to preserve; whether those rights are harmed will depend on the facts of the case”. 
The tribunal eventually found no breaches of the duty of good faith regarding the procedural 
conduct in the arbitration, paras. 594–596. 
  
 
on Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules rather than on Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention is unfortunate as the former are meant to implement the latter and be 
“subject to the Convention”.52 As a result, the interpreter must consider first and 
foremost Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. The Arbitration Rules could be 
used, when appropriate, to confirm, clarify or determine the meaning attached to 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. 
It follows that tribunals are expected to concentrate on Article 47 of the 
ICSID Convention and to meticulously interpret it in accordance with Articles 31 to 
33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), keeping in mind that 
“the text of the treaty is deemed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of 
the parties; and its elucidation, rather than wide-ranging searches for the 
supposed intentions of the parties, is the proper object of interpretation.”53 
The ordinary meaning of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention is straight- 
forward. All three of the authentic versions of the treaty refer to the power of 
ICSID tribunals to recommend provisional measures. The verb “to recom- mend” 
has an unambiguous meaning, which is definitely distinct from that of the verb “to 
order”. In using it in Article 47, the contracting parties to a treaty made a deliberate 
choice for the purpose of defining the powers of the tribu- nals and the related 
obligations of the parties to the dispute. 
That ICSID tribunals have received the power to recommend, but not to order, 
provisional measures is fully consistent with the object and purpose of both the 
treaty as a whole and Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. It cannot be postulated 
that these objects and purposes, namely ensuring a stable legal framework and an 
adequate protection of foreign investment, imperatively demand that ICSID 
tribunals have the competence to order the adoption of provisional measures. 
Arbitration Rule 39 can certainly be taken into account as context for the 
purpose of interpreting Article 47 of the ICSID Convention in accordance with 
Article 31 (2) of the VCLT. Being meant to implement Article 47, however, Rule 39 
cannot dislodge its clear literal meaning. Even assuming, for the sake of ar- gument, 
that the meaning of Article 47 is not entirely clear, it must be empha- sized that Rule 
39 does not point unambiguously to the mandatory character of provisional 
measures. In all three authentic texts, Rule 39 allows the parties 
 
52 C. Schreuer with L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, A. Sinclair, supra note 3, 683. 
53 Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part II, 
Chapter B, para. 22. Accordingly, as pointed out in Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona 
S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Jurisdiction, 16 May 2006, para. 54, “[t]he 
starting place for any exercise in interpretation is therefore the treaty text itself”. 
  
 
to the dispute to request a Tribunal to recommend the adoption of provisional 
measures to preserve their rights. And only the Spanish text makes a reference to “la 
dictación” of provisional measures, which alludes to their mandatory character.54 
The use of the term dictación in the Spanish version is the only ele- ment in Rule 39 
militating in favour of the mandatory character of provisional measures. However, 
such an element almost pales in significance compared with the clear and coherent 
use of the verb “to recommend” in all authentic versions of Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention as well as Arbitration Rule 39. 
From the standpoint of Article 33 of the VCLT, furthermore, it must be 
pointed out that the interpreter is not supposed to select one or several lan- guages, 
but rather to extract from the treaty “the best reconciliation of the 
differences”.55 Elevating the term dictación used in just one version of Rule 39 to the 
crucial element for the interpretation of Rule 39 is questionable, espe- cially when 
considering the rest of the Spanish version as well as the English and French 
versions, which unmistakably reveal the recommendatory nature of provisional 
measures. This conclusion is further strengthened by the clear indication contained 
in the Spanish version of note B to Arbitration Rule 39, published by ICSID in 
1968, that “a menos que las partes convengan lo con- trario, el Tribunal sólo tiene la 
facultad de ‘hacer recomendaciones’”.56 
Should any doubts remain, they should be dissipated by the travaux prépara- 
toires. The question of the nature of provisional measures was raised during the 
negotiations and the proposal to confer on tribunals to order their adop- tion was 
defeated. The verb “to prescribe” that appeared in a previous draft of what would 
become Article 47 of the ICSID Convention was eventually sup- planted by the 
verb “to recommend”, thus demonstrating the reluctance of the contracting parties to 
confer on ICSID tribunals the power to order provisional measures.57 
 
54 In City Oriente Ltd v. Ecuador, supra note 33, para. 52, for instance, the tribunal found that the 
distinction between recommending and ordering “is more apparent than it is real, since Rule 
39 (1) itself does, in its Spanish version, mention the ‘dictación’ [ordering] of the provisional 
measures, which demonstrates that, as far as the Rules are concerned, such words are used 
interchangeably”. 
55 R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd ed., 2015), 380. 
56 Reglas procesuales aplicables a los procedimientos de arbitraje, Regla 39, Notas B, p. 105, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20 
Regulations%20and%20Rules%201968%20-%20ENG.pdf. 
57 See, in particular, Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, 8 December 1964, in 
A. Broches, History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, 812–815. See also Quiborax 
v. Bolivia, supra note 33, Award, para. 578. On the legislative history of Article 47, see 
C.N. Brower,  R.E.M. Goodman, “Provisional Measures and the Protection  of  ICSID 
  
 
With regard to the LaGrand decision, there is no doubt that ICSID tribunals are 
allowed – and indeed must be encouraged58 – to look at the legal argu- ments 
developed by the ICJ as a source of inspiration to interpret investment- related 
treaties and to settle investment disputes. Yet, they must make sure that such 
arguments are susceptible to being extended to investment disputes, a question that 
largely depends on the text and content of the relevant legal in- struments, which in the 
case under discussion are Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. In the decisions sketched 
out above, ICSID tribunals conceded the sig- nificant textual differences between 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. They 
nonetheless largely overlooked them and did not see any obstacle to transposing 
in an almost mechanical fashion to the former the interpretation of the latter adopted 
by the ICJ. They passively borrowed the legal argument elaborated in LaGrand 
without inquiring as to the difference between Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. The former consistently and in all authentic 
languages uses the verb “to recommend”, whereas the latter employs, in the English, 
Spanish and French texts, the verb “to indicate”. The importance of the difference 
must not be underestimated since the use of “to recommend” in Article 47 of the 
ICSID Convention results from a deliberate choice made by the contracting parties, 
which were well aware of the text of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. Leaving aside its 
persuasiveness,59 the legal argument underpinning the LaGrand decision can find 
limited application in relation to Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. Two final 
related considerations – both having a distinct teleological flavour – deserve 
to be mentioned. The first concerns the well-established principle that the parties 
to a dispute must refrain from taking measures sus- ceptible to aggravate the dispute 
or hamper the execution of the award.60 The principle alone does not postulate the 
power of an arbitral tribunal to order mandatory provisional measures. Otherwise, 
the entire debate on the horta- tory or mandatory character of provisional measures 
that opposed leading 
 
 
Jurisdictional Exclusivity against Municipal Proceedings”, 6 ICSID Review (1991), 431, esp. 440 ff.; 
A.R. Parra, The History of ICSID (2012), esp. 173 ff. 
58 A. Pellet, “The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment Arbitration”, 28 ICSID Review (2013), 223. 
59 See Section III. 
60 See, for instance, Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 
Provisional Measures, 9 December 1983, 1 ICSID Reports (1993), 401, 411. In Caratube v. 
Kazakhstan, supra note 45, para. 67, the tribunal held that “the Parties have an obligation to 
conduct the procedure in good faith and that this obligation includes a duty to avoid any 
unnecessary aggravation of the dispute and harassment of the other party”. 
  
 
scholars for decades would not have made any sense. The existence of such an 
obligation and the legal nature of a decision by a tribunal on provisional measures 
are two different questions. The parties to a dispute must comply with the 
obligations stemming from the principle independently from the powers 
conferred on the tribunal or their exercise.61 
The second consideration relates to the consequences of disregarding a tri- bunal’s 
recommendation on provisional measures. During the negotiation of the ICSID 
Convention, a proposal that intended to introduce a sanction for non-compliance 
with these measures was rejected.62 Instead, it was agreed that ICSID tribunals 
would “take into account” such conduct.63 Some authors have associated the fact 
that tribunals could take into account the reluctance of any party to adopt the 
recommended measures with a “moral obligation” to do so.64 Be that as it may, the 
very fact that no sanction was attached to non- compliance seems to confirm – or at 
least to be compatible with – the horta- tory nature of such provisional 
measures. 
 
VII Relevance of the Attitude of ICSID Members 
If it is accepted that the interpretation upheld in the decisions sketched out above 
is not persuasive, it is appropriate to inquire with regard to what the consequences 
and implications may be.65 From this perspective, it must be kept in mind that the 
parties to a treaty remain “the transaction’s exclusive and absolute domini”66 and 
that international rules – including those contained in 
 
 
61 In Churchill Mining Plc and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 
and 12/40, Provisional Measures, 4 March 2013, para. 57, the tribunal held that “[w]hile the 
request for provisional measures must be denied, the Tribunal reminds the Parties of their 
general duty, which arises from the principle of good faith, not to take any action that may 
aggravate the dispute or affect the integrity of the arbitration”. See also text and note 51. 
62 See A.R. Parra, supra note 57, 86. 
63 A. Broches, supra note 57, p. 815; A.R. Parra, supra note 57, 178. 
64 G. Kaufmann-Kohler, A. Antonietti, supra note 31, 546. 
65 Significantly, in Quiborax v. Bolivia, Award, supra note 33, paras. 582 and 583, the tribunal 
conceded that the attribution of mandatory character to provisional measures can be seen as 
an “evolution of international law” with regard not only to investment arbitration, but also to the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ and the ECtHR. It even prospected the possibility that the respondent 
“may not have been aware of the binding nature of these provisional measures when it failed 
to comply with them”. 
66 Expression borrowed from G. Arangio-Ruiz, The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and the 
System of the Sources of International Law (1979), 284–285, esp. note 183. In Canadian 
  
 
international agreements – are created, modified and discarded through claims, 
counterclaims, actions and reactions by the subjects of international law.67 
Given the significant number of coherent decisions upholding the manda- tory 
character of provisional measures, it is not surprising that ICSID tribu- nals have 
recently limited themselves to referring to these decisions and have been reluctant to 
engage in a full discussion on the matter. Such an attitude is likely to be consolidated 
in future decisions. True, each tribunal is not legally bound by previous 
decisions.68 But it is also expected to consider and follow established case law to 
the fullest possible extent, with a view to enhancing the coherence and 
predictability of the whole system.69 As pointed out by an ICSID tribunal, 
unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, it ought to follow 
solutions established in a series of consistent cases, comparable to the case at 
hand, but subject of course to the specifics of a given treaty and of the 
circumstances of the actual case. By doing so, it will meet its duty to seek to 
contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to 
meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors 
towards certainty of the rule of law.70 
Yet, the crux of the matter remains the subsequent practice of the parties to the ICSID 
Convention with a view to establishing the possible informal modifica- tion of 
Article 47 in the sense of allowing ICSID tribunals to order provisional 
 
 
Cattleman for Fair Trade v. United States (UNCITRAL) NAFTA, the respondent clearly 
pointed out that “a treaty remains the exclusive province of the States parties themselves that may 
construct the treaty either expressly or tacitly through subsequent conduct”, Reply by the 
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measures. Article 31 (3) (b) of the VCLT clearly directs the interpreter to take into 
account any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty estab- lishing the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.71 From this perspective, the 
WTO Appellate Body has lucidly pointed out that this requires “a ‘concordant, 
common and consistent’ sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to 
establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties [to a treaty] 
regarding its interpretation”.72 
It therefore becomes crucial to assess the reaction or lack of reaction of the parties 
to the ICSID Convention. In this regard, it must first be emphasized that arbitral 
decisions cannot be treated as State practice.73 They remain the pronouncements of 
arbitral tribunals that have been mandated by the parties to settle a specific dispute 
between them. Strictly speaking, the effects of their decisions are confined to the 
parties to the dispute. They may, nonetheless, in- fluence State practice and trigger 
States’ reactions either in support or against the interpretation taken by the tribunal. 
The lack of reaction to or the acqui- escence in a consistent and significant body of 
decisions may amount to State practice and demonstrate the general acceptance by the 
parties to the treaty of the interpretation emerging from the arbitral decisions – 
even to the point of informally modifying the treaty through subsequent practice.74 
Acceptance by the disputing investor, on the contrary, is immaterial for the 
purpose of State practice, as only the States parties are the masters of the treaty. 
What is decisive is to establish whether State practice – rather than arbitral decisions 
– is sufficiently concordant, common and consistent.75 
With regard to the mandatory character of provisional measures, it is con- 
sequently the general acceptance of or acquiescence in arbitral tribunals’ de- cisions 
by the parties to the ICSID Convention that may lead – or may have 
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already led – to an informal modification of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. 
From this perspective, the presence of two elements must be shown. On the one 
hand, a significant number of arbitral tribunals must have shared the inter- pretation 
outlined above. On the other hand, the great majority of the parties to the treaty, 
having had ample opportunity to react to the interpretation, must have endorsed the 
new reading of the relevant provision or have refrained from contesting its 
inaccuracy. 
In the case of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, both elements seem to be satisfied. The decisions adopted by the 
various arbitral tribunals can be considered as having been sufficiently coherent and 
as having reached the critical mass. They were rendered during a time-span of about 
16 years and there is little record of any negative reac- tion by States, either of those 
appearing as respondents in proceedings or by other States. Although the fact that 
not all investment awards are available to the public calls for prudence, it may be 
concluded that a uniform and gener- ally accepted practice has emerged allowing 
ICSID tribunals to order binding provisional measures. Indeed, had the parties to the 
Convention perceived the decisions described above as an impairment of their rights 
or an alteration of their obligations, they would have had a bona fide duty to 
oppose them. 
 
VIII Conclusions 
A string of decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals since 1999 have upheld – 
virtually without opposition during the proceedings and amongst the parties to the 
ICSID Convention – the mandatory character of provisional measures under 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The 
legal arguments underpinning these decisions and principally the Spanish version of 
Rule 39 as well as teleological considerations developed along the lines of the ICJ 
decision in LaGrand are not entirely convincing. Nonetheless, tribunals appear to 
consider these decisions as “jurisprudence constante” and have confined themselves 
to refer to them without much elab- oration and with an almost religious 
deference. 
However, it is argued that these decisions imply a significant departure from 
the meaning the contracting parties recorded in the treaty. Such a law- making 
exercise does not suffice in itself to confer on an ICSID tribunal the competence 
not only to recommend, but also to order, these measures. If the overwhelming 
majority of ICSID members endorse, accept or at least acquies- cence in these 
decisions, however, an informal modification of Article 47 may be brought about. 
This is arguably what has happened in the last few years 
  
 
since these decisions have reached a critical mass and ICSID membership has 
acquiesced in the power of ICSID tribunals to order provisional measures. 
Attributing mandatory force to provisional measures can be deemed a 
welcome development from the point of view of the efficiency of investment 
arbitration and compliance with related awards. This is at once a chance and a burden. 
It will also bring ICSID jurisprudence in line with that of other inter- national 
tribunals and most prominently the ICJ. It can additionally be seen as another 
milestone in the rise of provisional measures to the legal Olympus of binding legal 
acts. Here, as in other treaty matters, the attitude of States parties is the decisive 
element. By remaining ostensibly silent, States may thus have brought about a 
significant shift in the legal situation. Indeed, they are the masters of the treaty, 
even when they remain silent. As Humpty Dumpty reminds us, the real question 
is “which is to be master – that’s all.”76 
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